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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Supreme Court has long held that "differences in the charac-
teristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them."' The Court has recognized for almost
a decade that cable television is a First Amendment medium. 2 But it did
not have an opportunity to assess in detail the characteristics of that me-
dium until 1994, when it did so in its opinion in Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. FCC.3 In the course of affirming the constitutionality of the
"must-carry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
* J.D. cum laude, 1989, Fordham Law School; LL.M. Candidate, 1995-96, Columbia
Law School. I would like to thank James C. Goodale for his intellectual inspiration and for
introducing me to the mixed-up world of cable television law. I would also like to thank
Steven R. Shapiro for helping me to focus my thoughts about the subject of this Essay.
1. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969) (citing Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
2. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494-95
(1986).
3. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
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and Competition Act of 1992 (the "1992 Act"), 4 the Court justified the
restrictions on the First Amendment rights of cable operators inherent in
those provisions by citing the operators' "bottleneck, or gatekeeper, con-
trol over most (if not all) of the television programming that is channeled
into the subscriber's home." 5 In other words, according to the Court,
cable operators are capable of "silenc[ing] the voice of competing speak-
ers [i.e., over-the-air broadcasters] with a mere flick of the switch."'6
The Court has indicated that it might reconsider its characterization of
a First Amendment medium when warranted by "technological develop-
ments."' 7 Despite the fact that the Turner Broadcasting decision was is-
sued just over two years ago, it is already ripe for such reconsideration.
The de facto monopoly that most cable operators have historically en-
joyed in their service areas-a prerequisite to the Court's bottleneck
analysis-may soon be a thing of the past. Maintenance of that monop-
oly has been possible only through legal restrictions on competition: (1)
exclusive franchising laws in most service areas; and (2) a federal ban on
the entry of telephone companies ("telcos") into cable television.
Although both of these restrictions were likely to be relegated to oblivion
on constitutional grounds,8 they were killed off by Congress in the 1992
Act and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act") before a
final constitutional determination was ripe. 9 Moreover, the number of
households that subscribe to cable alternatives such as satellite services
will more than double in the next four years. 10 Congress has retained the
must-carry provisions in the 1996 Act, but the statute and accompanying
legislative history are devoid of any showing of the need for this
continuation.
In Turner Broadcasting, the Supreme Court accepted, without mean-
ingful scrutiny, Congress's findings, in connection with the 1992 Act, con-
cerning the "bottleneck" characteristics of cable with respect to the need
for the must-carry provisions. As discussed in this Essay, that reflexive
acceptance was a mistake. Similar acceptance of Congress's non-findings
on the same issues, in connection with the 1996 Act, would be an even
4. The must-carry provisions of the 1992 Act are codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 534 requires cable systems with more than 12 channels and
300 subscribers to set aside up to one-third of their channels for a defined class of "local
commercial television stations." Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2453. Section 535 re-
quires carriage of local "noncommercial educational television stations" on a sliding scale.
Cable systems with 12 or fewer channels must carry at least one such station; systems with
13 to 36 channels must carry up to three; systems with more than 36 channels must carry all
stations requesting carriage. Id. at 2453-54.
5. Id. at 2466.
6. Id.
7. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.ll (1984) (discussing ration-
ale for broadcast scarcity doctrine).
8. See infra notes 45-71 and accompanying text.
9. The ban on exclusive franchising laws was enacted as part of the 1992 Act and is
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). The repeal of the ban on the entry of telcos into the
cable television business was enacted as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 124 (1996) (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)).
10. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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greater mistake. Judicial misperception of the state of a medium "is an
incubus on later understanding."" Shortsighted action based on an in-
complete cognizance of legal and technological developments can, as
here, serve to deprive speakers of their First Amendment rights without
justification. Such a misperception by the Court denied First Amend-
ment protection to motion pictures for thirty-seven years. 12 Reconsidera-
tion of Turner Broadcasting is necessary to avoid a similar mistake with
regard to cable television.
Fortunately, a call for such reconsideration is not simply an idle hope.
Although the Turner Broadcasting Court held that the must-carry provi-
sions would survive First Amendment scrutiny in the abstract, it re-
manded the matter to the district court for development of a more
complete factual record concerning the need for those provisions. 13 The
Court seemed particularly bothered that the district court had granted
the government's motion for summary judgment on the record before it.
On remand, though, the district court held, on the same record, that Con-
gress's findings were more than sufficient to support the must-carry provi-
sions, and once again granted summary judgment in favor of the
government. 14 The Supreme Court once again decided to review the dis-
trict court's holding.' 5 It is premature to speculate about whether the
Court acted out of displeasure with the district court's stubborn refusal to
try the case or whether it perceived the need to reconsider its earlier
holding.' 6 Whatever the Court's motivations, its decision to rehear the
action-immediately following the passage of the 1996 Act-presents the
ideal opportunity to correct its earlier conclusory determination about
the bottleneck characteristics of cable television.
II. THE IMPACT OF TURNER BROADCASTING
Turner Broadcasting was the Supreme Court's first attempt to answer a
question that had intrigued observers for many years: Was cable televi-
sion analogous to broadcast television (thereby permitting at least the
potential for a broad range of content-related regulations17), to newspa-
pers and other print media (thereby forbidding essentially all content-
11. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 7 (1983).
12. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915) ("the exhibition
of moving pictures is ... not to be regarded ... as part of the press of the country"),
overruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). The significance of
Mutual Film is detailed by Ronald W. Adelman in The First Amendment and the Metaphor
of Free Trade, which will be published in the Arizona Law Review later this year.
13. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470-72.
14. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 751 (D.D.C. 1995) (three-judge
panel).
15. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 907 (1996).
16. But cf. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reconsider Law Requiring Cable TV to Carry
Local Stations' Signals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1996, at A16 ("The very fact that the Court
decided on a second, full-dress review of the case suggests that the Justices were not satis-
fied with their 1994 ruling as the last word.").
17. Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 387-90.
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related regulations' 8), or to nothing? In Turner Broadcasting, the Court
chose the third alternative. Instead of relying on the old analogies, it
chose a new one: the cable operator as the gatekeeper of the televised
images received by subscribers.' 9 Relying on that characterization, the
Court found that the must-carry provisions are content-neutral regula-
tions which further an important governmental interest and which are
narrowly tailored to advance that interest.20
There is an interesting parallel between the Court's treatment of cable
operators and its treatment of broadcasters. Over the years, the Court
and commentators have come to characterize broadcasters as "public
trustees" with affirmative duties to avoid simply advancing their "own
political, social and economic views."'' l Although the Turner Broadcast-
ing Court explicitly rejected reliance on the "scarcity doctrine" which un-
derlies broadcast regulations,2 2 it is difficult to distinguish between the
trusteeship burdens imposed by the Court on broadcasters and cable op-
erators in practical terms. It is true that the subject matter of broadcast-
ers' trusteeship duties is wider. Over the years, broadcasters have been
compelled (or at least prodded) by the government, inter alia, to refrain
from airing editorials;23 to present "controversial" programming (includ-
ing editorials); 24 to refrain from airing songs "tending to promote or glo-
rify the use of illegal drugs";25 and to refrain, at least at certain times of
the day, from airing "indecent" programming.2 6 In contrast, the only
trusteeship duties imposed on cable operators so far are must-carry provi-
sions, indecency restrictions, 27 and, arguably, rate regulation. 28 But the
18. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255 (1974).
19. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2466.
20. Id. at 2469-72. In other words, the Court applied a version of the test from United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), which assesses the constitutionality of "content-
neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech." Id. at 2469. The O'Brien
test has been applied in all of the primary cable cases addressed in this Essay.
21. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973). See also THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 157-74 (1994).
22. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2456-57. The scarcity doctrine holds that "the
inherent physical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the broadcast medium
... require[s] some adjustment in traditional First Amendment analysis to place limited
content restraints, and impose certain affirmative obligations, on broadcast licensees." Id.
at 2457.
23. Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 339-40 (1940).
24. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1252-53 (1949).
25. Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28 F.C.C.2d
409,409 (1971). See also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 176-82 (1987) (discussing effects of FCC pressure on radio programmers con-
cerning drug-related lyrics).
26. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 657-59 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (dis-
cussing background of efforts to limit indecent programming), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701
(1996).
27. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 531-32, 559-61 (as amended by the 1996 Act).
28. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (up-
holding rate regulation under the 1992 Act), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 911 (1996). At first
glance, rate regulation is even further removed from regulation of content than is a must-
carry provision. But, as the D.C. Circuit observed, "[T]he government could not, consist-
ently with the First Amendment, cap the price of a newspaper at 25 cents in order to limit
1552 [Vol. 49
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principle is the same. After Turner Broadcasting, the perceived physical
characteristics of cable render it, like broadcast, a disfavored First
Amendment medium.
There is significant irony in this fact. Broadcasting has served as a con-
venient governmental target for decades, due in part to the perception of
the broadcast media as a powerful and pervasive influence on society.29
Now the broadcast industry is allegedly in such grave danger from cable
television that imposition of a must-carry obligation on cable operators is
necessary. 30
It is this discriminatory treatment of cable operators vis-A-vis tradi-
tional First Amendment speakers such as the print media, rather than the
content-neutrality or content-specificity of the must-carry provisions,
which threatens to be Turner Broadcasting's lasting legacy. 31 After all,
there can be little doubt that a law requiring newspapers to carry televi-
sion listings would be struck down, regardless of whether or not that law
was deemed content-neutral (and whether or not it was premised on a
legitimate concern over the possible demise of broadcast television).
"Laws that single out particular speakers are substantially more danger-
ous [than generally applicable laws], even when they do not draw explicit
content distinctions. ' 32 That is precisely the purpose and effect of the
must-carry provisions. Congress decided that broadcast television must
be "saved" at the expense of a portion of the cable operators' First
Amendment rights.33
monopoly profits and make the paper more affordable." Id. at 183. Implicitly, then,
cable's disfavored First Amendment status vis-A-vis newspapers permits the imposition of
an obligation to the public to charge no more than "reasonable" rates. The 1996 Act re-
tains rate regulation largely in its preexisting form, but only through March 31, 1999. Tele-
communications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. at 115 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 543(c)(4)).
29. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
30. It is hard to avoid being cynical about Congress's findings in this regard when the
passage of the must-carry provisions were at least partly due to "a giant lobbying effort" by
"television stations and the broadcast networks." Edmund L. Andrews, Re-Regulation of
Cable Is Likely to Pass House, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1992, at D21.
31. The question whether the must-carry provisions are content-neutral or content-
specific is outside the scope of this Essay. The Turner Broadcasting majority held that the
must-carry provisions were content-neutral. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2460-64.
That holding, however, provoked a heated four-person dissent. Id. at 2475-78 (O'Connor,
J., joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). The question is equally contro-
versial among commentators. Compare Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Un-
common Carriers: Identifying the "Speaker" Within the New Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 79, 109-10 (1995) (arguing in favor of content-neutrality) with Erik F. Ugland, Cable
Television, New Technologies and the First Amendment After Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. F.C.C., 60 Mo. L. REV. 799, 827-31 (1995) (arguing in favor of content-specificity).
32. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Minneap-
olis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 584, 591-92
(1983)).
33. One less intrusive alternative to a must-carry provision is the requirement that
cable operators who elect not to carry broadcast signals provide subscribers with an "A/B
switch," permitting subscribers to toggle between cable and broadcast signals. At one
time, the FCC considered this to be a promising alternative. Amendment of Part 76 of the
Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Televi-
sion Systems, 1 F.C.C.R. 864, 886 (1986). Unfortunately, this alternative proved ineffective
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The Turner Broadcasting majority acknowledged that "[r]egulations
that discriminate among media ... often present serious First Amend-
ment concerns," 34 but added that strict scrutiny of such regulations "is
unwarranted when the differential treatment is 'justified by some special
characteristic of' the particular medium being regulated. ' 35 "The must-
carry provisions," the Court added, "are justified by special characteris-
tics of the cable medium: the bottleneck monopoly power exercised by
cable operators and the dangers this power poses [sic] to the viability of
broadcast television. '36 Therefore, if cable lacks this "bottleneck monop-
oly power," the Court's entire analysis necessarily collapses.
III. ARE CABLE OPERATORS MONOPOLISTIC
GATEKEEPERS?
One of the striking features of Turner Broadcasting is the rigor with
which the Supreme Court analyzed the government's factual showing that
must-carry rules are necessary to preserve broadcast television. 37 That
rigor stands in marked contrast to the Court's unquestioning acceptance
of the characterization of cable operators as the gatekeepers of all televi-
sion programming. The opinion's sole factual citation in support of that
characterization is to an eleven-year-old book.38
To be sure, that book, Technologies of Freedom by Ithiel de Sola Pool,
is a landmark analysis of the First Amendment issues raised by electronic
media. In the 1983 world of exclusive municipal franchises, disruptions of
public rights-of-way required to lay coaxial cable, and lack of viable com-
because subscribers failed to use it. Thrner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32,
47 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing congressional findings), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
34. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2468.
35. Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2470-72 (remanding case to district court for "the parties to develop a more
thorough factual record"). On remand, the district court once again held that Congress
had made factual findings in support of the must-carry provisions sufficient to warrant
summary judgment in the government's favor. Turner Broadcasting, 910 F. Supp. 734, 751(D.D.C. 1995) (three-judge panel), prob. juris. noted, 116 S. Ct. 907 (1996). To be precise,
however, only Judge Stanley Sporkin believed that summary judgment in the government's
favor was appropriate. Judge Stephen F. Williams, in dissent, argued that, to the contrary,
summary judgment striking down the must-carry provisions were warranted. Id. at 755
(Williams J., dissenting). Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, "[h1eft to [his] own inclination,"
would have required a trial on the validity of the must-carry rules, but sided with Judge
Sporkin in order to avoid a "stalemate." Id. at 752 (Jackson, J., concurring). Judge Jack-
son's concurrence permitted Judge Sporkin's reflexively pro-government, anti-cable opin-
ion, which merely rehashed the majority's findings from the first district court's opinion, to
carry the day. Judge Sporkin's unblinking hostility to the cable industry is not surprising,
though, in view of his concurrence in the earlier opinion. There, he argued in favor of
denying even minimal First Amendment protection to cable operators, in large part be-
cause "[it is inconceivable that our forefathers contemplated at any time that the First
Amendment would be used to regulate an industry that came into existence over 150 years
after the Bill of Rights was adopted." Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 56 (Sporkin, J.,
concurring). That "reasoning" is alien to established First Amendment jurisprudence.




petition, concern over the bottleneck tendencies of cable television was
inevitable. De Sola Pool's innovative solution was to treat cable systems
as outright common carriers. 39 He foresaw effective competition for
cable through a broadband integrated services digital network (ISDN) as
lying ten or twenty years down the road. In the interim, he argued, com-
mon carrier status would avert a "troubled decade or two of cable system
dominance. '40 It is somewhat misleading, therefore, for the Court to
have cited de Sola Pool's statement without assessing whether the factual
predicate for his statement was still valid. That is particularly true in light
of de Sola Pool's conviction that regulation of electronic media was "a
last recourse. '41 This section, then, is devoted to the analysis that the
Turner Broadcasting Court failed to undertake.42
As a threshold matter, there is no evidence that cable operators are
engaged in widespread "monopolistic practices" in the legal sense, as de-
fined by the antitrust laws.43 The Court's reference to cable operators'
"bottleneck monopoly power"44 is therefore a more informal characteri-
zation of the state of the television market.
A. THE DEMISE OF EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISES
Most of us (including, probably, the Justices of the Supreme Court) are
personally unfamiliar with access to competitive cable, or cable-like, ser-
vice providers. We were equally unfamiliar at one time with access to
competitive long distance telephone services. The Court's conclusions
concerning the monopolistic tendencies of the cable industry reflect that
lack of familiarity. In fact, there is nothing inevitable about having access
to only one cable operator, even in the short run.
For most of cable's history, systems have been authorized to operate
through governmental (most often, municipal) franchises. Municipal reg-
ulation is perfectly sensible in view of a cable system's need for access to
physical infrastructure (i.e., streets, poles) in order to operate.4 5 "Regu-
lating such use and inconvenience, however, is quite different from re-
stricting access" through the use of a rigid exclusive franchising rule. 46 In
39. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 11, at 171-76.
40. Id. at 186. The common carrier solution, of course, never managed to win govern-
mental favor.
41. Id. at 246.
42. On remand, the Turner Broadcasting district court also failed to consider the issue
in any meaningful detail. Turner Broadcasting, 910 F. Supp. at 740.
43. There is no question that the antitrust laws apply fully to media entities. See Asso-
ciated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
44. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2468.
45. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-28
(7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-
78 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
46. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1406 (9th
Cir. 1985) (hereinafter Preferred I), affd in part and remanded in part, 476 U.S. 488 (1986)
(hereinafter Preferred II), affd and remanded, 13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir.) (hereinafter Pre-
ferred II1), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2738 (1994). In Preferred III, the Ninth Circuit specifi-
cally adopted the analysis and conclusions of Preferred L Preferred 111, 13 F.3d at 1330 n.4.
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other words, minimizing disruption of the streets is a substantial govern-
mental interest, but an exclusive franchising rule-in the absence of proof
that the infrastructure could not accommodate a second franchise-is not
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 47
In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,48 the City of
Los Angeles also contended that its "one area/one franchise" rule was
justified as a recognition that cable service is in fact a "natural monop-
oly."'49 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this contention as a "[r]epackaging"
of the City's interests in "avoiding traffic disruption and visual blight." 50
On a more abstract level, the City's justification is an exercise in circular
reasoning. There is nothing "natural" about a monopoly that was created
by governmental fiat.51 Whether or not cable service has the characteris-
tics of a natural monopoly, the City failed to give nature a chance to take
its course. It was therefore unable to demonstrate the factual premise
behind its justification.
The Supreme Court, of course, is not bound by the Ninth Circuit's in-
terpretation of constitutional law. It is, however, bound to consider the
effect of federal statutory law. The 1992 Act provides that "a franchising
authority may not grant an exclusive franchise and may not unreasonably
refuse to award an additional competitive franchise. '52 That provision
was not directly before the Turner Broadcasting Court, but it was cer-
tainly relevant to the Court's analysis and should have been addressed in
the opinion. How can the speech rights of cable operators be regulated
on the theory that they are quasi-monopolists when the legal predicate
behind the very conditions that created that status have been abolished?
One answer may be the determination (albeit conclusory) of the D.C.
Circuit that the effects of the pre-1992 status "linger on."'53 On the other
hand, there is evidence that effective competition may already, or soon
will, be a reality in many parts of the country, including New York, 54 Los
47. Preferred 1, 754 F.2d at 1405-06 (applying the O'Brien test to Los Angeles' exclu-
sive franchise rule).
48. 13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2738 (1994).
49. Id. at 1332.
50. Id.
51. Cf. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (cable
television's "tendency toward monopoly, if present at all, may well be attributable more to
governmental action-particularly the municipal franchising process-than to any 'natural'
economic phenomenon"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
52. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). The circuit courts are divided over the retroactive effect of
this provision to governmentally-designated exclusive franchises in existence before the
1992 Act became effective. Compare Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. United States,
992 F.2d 1178, 1181-82 (11th Cir. 1993) (provision must be applied retroactively) with
James Cable Partners, L.P. v. City of Jamestown, 43 F.3d 277, 279-80 (6th Cir. 1995) (provi-
sion may not be applied retroactively).
53. Time Warner, 56 F.3d at 184. The court's position in this respect would be stronger
but for the imminent entry of the telcos into the cable market and the other factors
portending increased competition in the cable industry. See infra notes 52-62, 67 and ac-
companying text.




Angeles, 55 Chicago, 56 Baltimore, 57 and Hartford.58 In any event, the
legal bar on exclusive franchises merited consideration by the Court as a
prerequisite to upholding the significant regulation of speech inherent in
the must-carry provisions.
B. COMPETITION FROM TELCOS
One of the curiosities of the 1992 Act is its implicit contradictory stance
on competition in the cable industry. 59 Congress determined that viewers
were disserved by the lack of competition in the provision of cable serv-
ices, but deliberately declined to repeal the ban on the provision of serv-
ices by the likeliest competitors to incumbent cable operators: the
telcos. 60 That decision-taken in spite of findings by the FCC and the
Department of Justice that repeal of the cross-ownership ban would en-
hance competition-spurred the telcos to seek a judicial declaration of
the ban's unconstitutionality. 61
Congress has reversed itself in the 1996 Act. Telcos are now free to
enter the cable market essentially without restriction.62 But that action
probably only hastened the inevitable. The telcos' efforts to have the
cross-ownership ban declared unconstitutional met with resounding suc-
cess. Every court that considered the question struck down the ban
under the O'Brien test as not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the govern-
mental interest in preventing telco domination of the cable industry.63 In
the words of one court, Congress chose the most "'draconian"' approach
without any proof that a less restrictive measure would suffice. 64
55. Jennifer Pendleton, In the Oncoming Lane of the Info Highway; Television: Cable
Operator CVI Is Planning a Fiber-Optic Upgrade to Deliver Expanded Services, Including,
Potentially, Telecommunications, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at 4.
56. Martha Russis, Ameritech Cable Targets Hoffman Estates, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept.
12, 1995, at 1.
57. JoAnna Daemmrich, Bill Would Give Franchise to Second Cable Company, BALTI-
MORE SUN, June 7, 1995, at IA.
58. Susan E. Kinsman, Court Gives Cable Firm the Green Light; Fibervision Can Build
Competing Franchise, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 22, 1995, at B7.
59. Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721, 726-27 (N.D. III. 1994).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (the "cross-ownership ban") (repealed at 110 Stat. 124). The
ban was enacted in 1984 in order "'to prevent the development of local media monopo-
lies."' US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1984)).
61. Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 727.
62. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 124 (1996) (repealing 47 U.S.C.
§ 533(b)).
63. US West, 48 F.3d at 1105-06; Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42
F.3d 181, 202 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated for consideration ofmootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996);
Southern New England Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211, 219 (D. Conn. 1995);
NYNEX Corp. v. United States, No. CIV 93-323-P-C, 1994 WL 779761, at *1 (D. Me. Dec.
8, 1994); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335, 1343 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Amer-
itech, 867 F. Supp. at 736.
64. Southern New England Tel., 886 F. Supp. at 219 (quoting Chesapeake and Potomac
Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 928 (E.D. Va. 1993)). The cross-ownership ban
is premised on the fear that telcos, if permitted to compete, "would engage in the anti-
competitive practices of cross-subsidization [use of revenues from telephone operations to
subsidize incipient cable operations] and pole-access discrimination." Chesapeake and Po-
1996] 1557
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The Supreme Court had already agreed to hear one of the cross-owner-
ship ban cases 65 when Congress repealed the ban. The Court responded
by summarily remanding the case to the Fourth Circuit for consideration
of whether that repeal rendered the case moot,66 which was undoubtedly
the correct result. Hopefully, though, the Court will give at least some
consideration to the significance of the repeal when it reviews the Turner
Broadcasting remand.
C. ADDITIONAL ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL CABLE SERVICE
Wholly apart from the foregoing, the next few years are likely to bring
a decline in the "market power" (to borrow an antitrust term) of tradi-
tional cable operators. This decline will be caused by the growth of cable
alternatives, including direct broadcast satellite (DBS), satellite master
antenna TV (SMATV), backyard satellite dishes, and wireless cable. One
study predicts that traditional cable will have a subscription of 61.5 mil-
lion households in 1999, up from the current 59.4 million households. 67
In contrast, subscriptions to the alternative media should reach 10.3 mil-
lion homes by 1999, up from 5 million at the end of 1995.68 In addition,
the study expects the telcos' cable service to have 1.8 million subscribers
by 1999, with rapid acceleration thereafter.69 Currently, cable accounts
for 62.3% of U.S. households with television, cable alternatives for 5.2%,
and broadcast for 32.5%.70 In 1999, cable will account for a slightly
smaller percentage of households. The overall non-broadcast percentage,
though, will increase to 73.7% due to the rise of the cable alternatives. 71
Further down the road, the relative abundance created by these alter-
natives will be dwarfed by the growth of television over the Internet or
other online networks to be developed.72 Although large-scale access to
video programming is currently unfeasible due to the state of technology
(a half-hour show requires almost twenty-four hours to download), 73 es-
tablished video programmers such as NBC, CBS, and CNN have already
established systems for transmission via cyberspace.74 The ability to
transmit audio in real time, on the other hand, already exists. Using a
tomac Tel., 42 F.3d at 200. There is no reason, however, why both potential practices can-
not be prevented by regulations narrowly tailored to address those practices. Id. at 207.
65. United States v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995).
66. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel., 116 S. Ct. at 1036.
67. John M. Higgins, Cable Won't Lose Subs Quickly, Study Predicts, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, Aug. 7, 1995, at 31 (citing the annual Communications Industry Forecast prepared
by the investment banking firm of Veronis, Suhler & Associates).
68. Id. DBS is expected to have 4 million subscribers in 1999; backyard dishes are
expected to have 3 million subscribers; wireless cable is expected to have 2 million sub-




72. See, e.g., Chris Woodyard, Pairing of TV, PC Not So Remote, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Mar. 31, 1996, at 5.
73. Joshua Quittner, Radio Free Cyberspace, TIME, May 1, 1995, at 91.
74. Kevin Coughlin, Net Video, The Future Doesn't Work Very Well at the Moment,
STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 5, 1996.
1558 [Vol. 49
FIRST AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS
technology called "RealAudio," 350 radio stations have made programs,
including the 1996 Super Bowl, available on the Internet. 75 There is no
reason to believe that video will not catch up in a few years.
Eventually, new technology will foster the rise of interactive television.
At that point, a programmer "would need little more than a microphone,
a camcorder and a PC" to compete in the video "marketplace of ideas."'76
When that occurs, the current controversies over abundance and diversity
will seem ludicrous.
It is possible that the Turner Broadcasting Court, after considering the
relevant data, would nevertheless have determined that traditional cable
operators exercise gatekeeper control over the dissemination of video
images. The problem is that the Court did not consider them at all, but
rather accepted on blind faith the notion of cable operators as
gatekeepers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legal establishment has historically looked down on new forms of
media, even to the extent of proposing that they be denied First Amend-
ment protection altogether. One example is the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of movies.77 A second example is Alexander Meiklejohn's
assertion that radio speech was not entitled to protection because it had
"'failed' in its promise to assist in our national education; it was engaged
in making money, not in 'enlarging and enriching human communica-
tion.' 78 A third example is Jerome Barron's conclusion that cable opera-
tors are not engaged in First Amendment speech in their basic function of
selecting and transmitting programming. 79
The Supreme Court has not taken such an extreme position with re-
spect to broadcast media and cable. But its leading opinions on those
media, respectively Red Lion and Turner Broadcasting, demonstrate the
Court's deep distrust of their First Amendment worthiness. The Court's
implicit wariness about cable led it to accept on blind faith the popular
assumption that cable is a gatekeeper, even to the extent of ignoring signs
that those gatekeeper characteristics were waning.
75. Id. See also Quittner, supra note 73, at 91 (National Public Radio and the ABC
Radio Network have made news programs available on the Internet through the use of
RealAudio).
76. Webbed: Video on the Internet, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 1996, at 82.
77. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
78. POWE, supra note 25, at 30 (quoting A. MEIKLFJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RE-
LATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) revised as POLITICAL FREEDOM 78-89 (1960)).
79. Jerome A. Barron, On Understanding the First Amendment Status of Cable: Some
Obstacles in the Way, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1495, 1505 (1989). Professor Barron,
through his article, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967), was an early advocate of the view that all mass media, including large newspa-
pers could be compelled to publish opposing views. The Supreme Court rejected that ap-
proach in Miami Herald v. Tornillo, a case which Professor Barron, on behalf of Pat
Tornillo, argued before the Court.
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The 1996 Act removes the last official barrier to the existence of a
wide-open market for the provision of cable services. Yet, the 1996 Act
also retains the must-carry provision, which is premised on a closed mar-
ket. If First Amendment scrutiny, even under the more lenient O'Brien
test, means anything at all, the Court should use its review of the Turner
Broadcasting remand to assess critically the continued need for must-
carry rules in view of that fact.
